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Abstract. In this paper we explicate the notion of a  miracle and highlight 
a suitable ontological framework for it. Our proposal draws on insights from 
Aquinas’s discussion of miracles and from the modern ontology of powers. We 
argue that each substance possesses a characteristic set of natural powers and 
dispositions which are operative or become manifest in the right circumstances. 
In a miracle divine intervention activates the fundamental disposition inherent 
in each creature to be responsive to God’s call. Thus, a miracle brings something 
about which a substance’s set of natural powers and dispositions could not bring 
about by itself.
INTRODUCTION
In Quentin Tarantino’s cult movie Pulp Fiction an alleged miracle plays 
a central role: Vincent and Jules, two hitmen employed by crime boss 
Marcellus Wallace, are ordered to retrieve a stolen briefcase from a group 
of drug dealers. The hitmen arrive at their dealers’ apartment and execute 
two of them but fail to notice that a third person is hiding in the kitchen. 
Suddenly this person jumps out and shoots at Jules and Vincent from 
close range. Miraculously, neither Jules nor Vincent receives a hit; both 
remain unhurt, even though the bullets hit the wall behind them. Here is 
the central dialogue about this event:
Vincent: [...] Lighten up a little. You been sittin’ there all quiet.
Jules: I just been sittin’ here thinkin’.
Vincent: About what?
Jules: The miracle we witnessed.
Vincent: The miracle you witnessed. I witnessed a freak occurrence.
Jules: Do you know that a miracle is?
248 GEORG GASSER & JOSEF QUITTERER
Vincent: An act of God.
Jules: What’s an act of God?
Vincent: I guess it’s when God makes the impossible possible. And I’m 
sorry Jules, but I don’t think what happened this morning qualifies.
Vincent: [...] You’re judging this thing the wrong way. [...] You don’t 
judge s*** like this based on merit. [...] What is significant is I felt God’s 
touch, God got involved.
Vincent: But why?
Jules: That’s what’s f***in’ wit’ me! I don’t know why. But I can’t go back 
to sleep.
In this short dialogue Vincent provides a  preliminary definition of 
a miracle: It is when God makes the impossible possible. In this paper 
we aim at explicating this notion. We do so by contrasting it with Hume’s 
famous definition of a miracle and by specifying a suitable ontological 
context of “making the impossible possible”. Finally, we address some 
worries which might arise from this account.
THE HUMEAN CONCEPT OF A MIRACLE
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding David Hume states:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable 
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from 
the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience 
can possibly be imagined.1
Without analyzing Hume’s argument against miracles in detail, it is safe 
to say that it depends on the assumption that the existence of a supposed 
law of nature is supported by our experience and that the latter receives 
the highest degree of rational assurance. The idea is that the observation 
of events of type X being followed by events of type Y justifies the 
conclusion that there is a law of nature stating that all Y-like events are 
preceded always and everywhere by X-like events. Laws of nature are 
exceptionless regularities. Thus, if we notice an event of type X, we have 
the highest degree of rational assurance that the next event will be of 
type Y. As Hume puts it, we have “a firm and unalterable experience” 
according to which Y follows on from X.
1 Hume (1999), section x, § 12.
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However, it is easy to imagine that our observations were mistaken. 
Maybe we took it that all X-like events are followed by Y-like events but 
in fact some X-like events were followed by Z-like events which are very 
similar to Y-like events and therefore we didn’t distinguish accordingly, 
thus rendering our conclusion false. Or we rightly observed that so far 
all X-like events are followed by Y-like events but this past observation 
does not guarantee that the course of nature remains the same in the 
near or remote future. In other words, the assumption that it is rational 
to assign the maximal degree of assurance to the existence of a  law of 
nature is hardly convincing. Yet to substantiate his view, Hume would 
have to show that it is always less rational to believe that an event e is 
an event not subsumable under a  law of nature than to believe either 
(i) that e did not occur, or (ii) that the occurrence of e is at the end 
consistent with the law of nature, or (iii) that the alleged law of nature is 
not a law after all.
Among others, philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright argues that 
the Humean conception of a natural law as exceptionless and universally 
true should at best be considered an idealization of and abstraction from 
natural events which we are able to examine under highly specific and 
artificial laboratory conditions.2
If the best places to look for Humean natural laws are highly artificial 
lab conditions where potential interfering factors can be prevented, 
then it appears reasonable to be careful to apply Hume’s formulation 
to real world instances. It would be less contentious if Hume had said 
that our observation that all X-like events are followed by Y-like events 
gives us a high degree of rational assurance that this particular instance 
of X’s occurrence will be followed by an  instance of Y’s occurrence. It 
is reasonable to expect this course of nature, but a possible alternative 
course  – however minimal its probability  – shouldn’t be excluded 
either. The difference between ascribing the maximal degree of rational 
assurance and a merely high one to a general statement taken for a law 
of nature is not as small as it might first appear: It separates a  highly 
unconvincing claim with a not particularly controversial one.
Consider the case of an  alleged miracle: The Humean notion 
of a  natural law does not make miracles merely highly improbable 
(an assumption which easily can be accepted) – but utterly impossible 
as the above options (i)-(iii) show. The Humean notion of a miracle as 
2 Cartwright (1999), 2-3.
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a violation of a law of nature renders a miracle logically impossible, for 
by definition laws of nature cannot be violated. In addition, miracles 
appear on this view to be not only logically but also naturally impossible. 
The reason is simply this: If a miracle is a violation of a law of nature and 
laws of nature tell us which events are naturally possible, then a miracle 
is tantamount to a naturally impossible event.
A proponent of a Humean account might try to avoid the worrisome 
collapse of logical and natural possibility with the help of possible 
worlds. He could argue as follows: A naturally impossible event can be 
distinguished from a  logically impossible by being impossible only in 
those worlds with the same natural laws as ours. In possible worlds with 
other natural laws, an event which is naturally impossible in our world 
may be naturally possible. Thus, the distinction between logical and 
natural possibility can be maintained by specifying the set of possible 
worlds we are referring to. Though this proposal is able to catch the 
meaning of “naturally impossible” in some worlds in contrast to others, it 
doesn’t capture what most people traditionally think of as a miracle, that 
is, a logically possible but naturally impossible event caused by God.3 For 
a translation into possible-world jargon says that there is a type of event 
which cannot happen in our world (or in a set of possible worlds with 
similar laws of nature) but which could well happen in a world with very 
different natural laws. Imagining that a miracle happened, however, does 
not mean imagining an alternative world with alternative laws; it means 
distinguishing between the realm of the logically possible and the realm 
of the naturally impossible and to imagine that a logically possible but 
naturally impossible event can actually occur in our world. There are 
several reasons for preferring this notion of miracle to a Humean one:
First, our preferred notion is conceptually broader because a miracle 
is an event beyond the reach of any natural laws. It is divinely caused and 
not resulting from a comparison between the effects possible because of 
the natural laws in our world and those possible because of any possible 
natural laws in any other possible world.
3  A  less demanding meaning of a  miracle is that an  event is caused by God  – 
irrespective of whether it is naturally impossible or possible. In ScG 101 Thomas Aquinas 
distinguishes between logically possible but naturally impossible and logically and 
naturally possible events caused by God. The latter is a miracle in a weaker sense than 
the former, but it is still a miracle because it is caused by God and not by a natural cause. 
Such account is also proposed in Mumford (2000), 280, where a miracle is defined as 
“natural events or facts which have a supernatural cause”.
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Second, our preferred notion captures the traditional meaning 
of a miracle as divinely caused and no sophisticated naturalistic re-
interpretation is necessary. Avoiding such a re-interpretation suggests also 
that the traditional notion is neither flawed nor in need of replacement.4
Third, the occurrence of a miracle requires that an alleged Humean 
natural law be abandoned even though it would still be applicable to 
all other similar instances. If Jules and Vincent did indeed experience 
a miracle, then a Humean would have to abandon a law like “If someone 
fires live ammunition at a big animal at very close range, then this animal 
will be at least severely injured”, even though this law might still work 
perfectly well for all other instances where someone aims at an animal 
with a  firearm at close range. Wouldn’t it be easier to acknowledge 
a miracle as an exception from a suitable natural law instead of jettisoning 
the law altogether? For how should a general law be formulated so as 
to encompass a singular divine intervention at a particular moment in 
history? Yet with no general law, a Humean is left empty-handed.
These considerations provide reasons to prefer a  notion of natural 
law which allows for exceptions to general regularities for if there should 
be miracles then the Humean has no proper resources to integrate them 
into his or her account. In the next section we provide an  account of 
natural laws along these lines – the normative account of natural law.5
LAWS OF NATURE, DISPOSITIONS, AND MIRACLES
According to E. J. Lowe natural laws have important structural parallels 
with moral or legal laws. Normative terms suggest that something should 
(or shouldn’t) be the case: If the state legislates payment of one’s taxes, 
then I should pay my taxes; if moral goodness requires me to help those 
in need, then I  should help those in need; if it is forbidden to smoke 
in a public area, then I shouldn’t smoke there. Similarly, a natural law 
states how an individual x of the substantial kind K is disposed to exhibit 
a range of characteristic dispositions under given circumstances, that is, 
4 See, for instance, Lowe’s harsh evaluation of the Humean proposal in his (1987), 272: 
“The [Humean] proposal is therefore an insult to the intelligence of those who believe 
that they can imagine a miracle to have occurred, implying as it does that they are simply 
confused.”
5 For a detailed discussion see the work of Lowe (1987), Mumford (1998a), (2000) and 
(2001) to which we orient ourselves.
252 GEORG GASSER & JOSEF QUITTERER
how this individual should react given these circumstances. When we say, 
for instance, that a particular chemical x is explosive, we are saying that x 
possesses specific dispositions because x belongs to a certain kind K, so 
that a natural law expresses what kind of behavior is expected from x as 
a typical individual belonging to K under specific circumstances.6 That is, 
a law of nature refers to the dispositions of “normal” individuals of some 
kind K to behave under specific circumstances. It does not state how 
an individual of a certain kind will necessarily act or react; rather, it tells 
us only what behavior or reaction should be expected from an individual 
of this kind. Accordingly, examples of natural laws like “Pure water 
reaches its maximum density at 4 °C” or “Polar bears have white coats” 
can be true even though for some reason not all instances of pure water 
reach their maximum density at 4 °C, or if some polar bear is born with 
a brown coat due to particular circumstances. Thus, a crucial advantage 
of a normative account of a natural law, as opposed to a regularity view, 
is that the former can allow for exceptions. The reason is that a law of 
nature, on this view, indicates a specific standard from which deviations 
are possible.7
It is important to note at this point that a  normative account can 
distinguish between exceptions from the norm, on the one hand, and 
the deviation of normal members from their kind, on the other. Take for 
instance a polar bear with a brown coat. Assuming that all normal polar 
bears have white coats, this deviation from the standard could be due 
to a genetic abnormity affecting this particular polar bear. Such a case 
does not falsify the general law that polar bears tend to have white coats. 
There is only one situation in which the discovery of an exception cannot 
peacefully co-exist with a natural law – when the exception represents 
a norm of its own. Imagine that scientists discover that, in a closed-off 
Arctic costal strip, an entire group of polar bears is disposed to be born 
brown-coated. In this case, the general law “Polar bears have white coats” 
would be falsified, and a new law to the effect that a certain sub-kind of 
polar bears have brown coats would have to be added. Indeed, if a polar 
bear of the brown-coated variety were to grow a white coat, then this 
6 Lowe (2006), 8.4.-8.6.
7  Lowe (1980), 257, writes: “As I  see it, the most that a  law like ‘Ravens are black’ 
purports to tell us concerning individuals is what we should expect any normal 
individual raven be like [...] Such a law is ‘normative’ or regulative in force with respect 
to individuals, and it is precisely in this that its ‘nomic’ character resides.”
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would amount to an exception from the newly discovered brown-coated 
law. In short, natural laws can peacefully co-exist with exceptions as long 
as these exceptions do not constitute a normative value of its own.
One might worry about a  normative account of natural laws on 
the grounds that it puts too much normativity into the natural world. 
The worry derives from the intuition that normativity is not simply 
“out there”. Analyzing the natural world reveals substances, properties, 
events, relations and regularities among them, and these are descriptive 
facts, not normative ones. One might add that it is reasonable to presume 
that norms are instead the result of a  specific norm-giving process as 
the issuing a law makes apparent. Without a specific legislative process 
a legal law cannot come into force.8
How might we set this worry aside? One way is to argue that natural 
laws are a  species of normative laws, because they are given by God. 
Within a theistic framework, such a view is neither bold nor particularly 
controversial. However, it is hard to swallow for someone who wants to 
remain neutral regarding the existence of God or who for other reasons 
would shrink from making natural laws depend on a  supernatural 
lawmaker.9
Arguably the easiest way to meet this concern is to ground the 
normative character of natural laws in a  dispositional understanding 
of reality.10 Recall that Lowe’s normative account says that a  natural 
law involves both a  dispositional predication and a  substantial-
kind term; that is, it states the dispositions that are characteristic of 
a specific substantial kind. On this view, a given instance of predication 
asserts that an  individual object of a particular kind has actualized its 
characteristic dispositions. “Polar bears are white” means that members 
of the substantial kind “polar bear” tend to be white. “This polar bear 
is white”, instead, means that an instance of the substantial kind “polar 
bear” has actualized the typical disposition of being white. Assuming 
that dispositions are real properties in the world, we can argue that the 
8 A similar account might apply to moral norms..
9 See, for instance, Mumford (1998a): The notion of a law of nature as a prescription 
has obvious connections with the possible existence of a supernatural being that is the 
lawmaker.
10 For a long time dispositions were kept out of most ontologies, but in recent decades 
they have made an astonishing comeback. See, for instance, Mumford (1998b), Kistler 
and Gnassounou (2007), Handfield (2009), and Marmadoro (2010), among many other 
publications.
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normative character of natural laws indicates which dispositions reside 
in a specific substantial kind.
Take, for instance, a  probabilistic law describing an  individual’s 
behavior, say a  chemical c with a  0.5 probability of exploding under 
a  type of circumstances x. The probabilistic law describes c’s tendency 
to react under x-type circumstances, not the way in which c’s instances 
have actually reacted in the world history under circumstances of type x. 
The reason is that dispositions need not be manifested. It might even be 
that there is no single instance of c’s actually exploding; even so, the law 
describing c’s 0.5 probability of exploding under x-type circumstances 
will remain true as long as it is indeed c’s disposition to explode with 0.5 
probability under circumstances of type x.
The advantage of a  dispositionalist understanding of natural laws 
is also apparent when we compare two identical world histories. The 
regularity theory regards natural laws as supervening on those histories. 
Two world histories containing the same actualized events have the same 
laws of nature because actualized events are the only ontological resources 
for construing such laws. Within an ontology that accepts dispositions, 
by contrast, one might argue that these two world histories, although 
identical in their actual unfolding, are not identical simpliciter because 
the worlds might differ with regard to unrealized laws, on account of 
dispositions which have not yet been manifested.11
Let us take stock: We argued that there are good reasons to construe 
a  law of nature as a  description of the dispositions or powers which 
a  thing has in virtue of being an  instance of a determinate substantial 
kind. A law of nature tells us, so to speak, how a normal individual of 
a  certain substantial kind typically behaves or interacts because of its 
the dispositions and causal powers. Talk of a thing’s “normal behavior” 
does not presuppose any prescriptive rules, but merely a dispositionalist 
ontology. A  law of nature is a  norm which indicates the dispositional 
character or range of powers residing in individuals belonging to the 
kind in question. Exceptions to the norm are surprising but not excluded 
because they can simply be thought of as the manifestation of other, less 
common, dispositions.
How does this view relate to miracles? We propose that, in a miracle, 
God activates the under normal circumstances hidden dispositional 
setup of a substance, so as to make it the case, for instance, that bullets 
11 Mumford (1998a), 93.
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cause no damage to an organic body. Consider Daniel 3: 27, which says 
that “the fire had no power” over the bodies of the three young men 
in the fire. This formulation captures the essence of the miracle: The 
fire had no power over the bodies because in this particular situation 
an additional power of the body was activated by divine intervention. 
Consequently, the fire’s characteristic power to cause great harm in 
a  living body remains unmanifested. Due to divine power the mutual 
exercise of the causal powers of the substances involved is affected, that 
is, the power of fire and of living bodies.
In such a  situation the laws of nature remain valid; but, since they 
supervene on the dispositions of the substances involved, they are not 
manifested. God’s additional intervening power alters the original 
subvenient base of the laws of nature. Divine (and also non-divine) 
intervention is no violation of the laws of nature because these laws 
express the manifestation of dispositions under specific circumstances. 
The addition of a new power to the mix, however, unsurprisingly changes 
the outcome from what we would have expected.
In his discussion in the Summa Contra Gentiles of the possibility of 
God’s acting beyond (preater) the natural order, Aquinas elaborates this 
view. For him, a miracle would violate the natural order (ordo naturalis) 
only if natural causes were to produce their effects necessarily. This is not 
the case, however, because the intrinsic dispositions of things manifest 
their characteristic effects with a particular probability between 0 and 
1. There is a certain inclination of a thing to “do more this than that” 12 
which establishes regularity in nature but not necessity.13 He says:
Now, if someone says that, since God did implant this order in things, 
the production in things of an effect independently of its proper causes, 
and apart from the order established by Him, could not be done without 
a change in this order, this objection can be refuted by the very nature 
12 See ST Ia IIae q1, a2: For if an agent were not oriented toward some effect, then it 
would not do this more than that.
13  For Aquinas, the best available explanation for the regular behavior of entities 
requires the positing of (active and passive) powers and inclinations. The existence of 
powers in a  thing grounds facts about the kind of effects which that thing can cause. 
Reference to the thing’s inclination explains the intrinsic feature disposing it to cause 
some forms of effect more than others. This view has structural parallels to recent debates 
in the metaphysics of causal powers. For instance, Molnar (2006, chap. 3) discusses the 
physical intentionality of powers and Mumford & Anjum (2011, chap. 3) think of causes 
as tending toward an effect of a certain kind.
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of things. For the order imposed on things by God is based on what 
usually occurs, in most cases, in things, but not on what is always so. In 
fact, many natural causes produce their effects in the same way, but not 
always.14
In the light of such a view, any talk of “breaking the natural order” or 
“violating the laws of nature” is misleading, since the modal force of 
necessity is not present in nature.
Aquinas goes on to mention various conditions that are responsible 
for the production of an effect which deviates from the ordo naturalis. 
One such condition is that the agent has greater strength than the patient. 
Aquinas gives the example of the tidal ebb and flow. Here, a  celestial 
“higher” body acts upon a natural “lower” one. The natural inclination 
of water to move toward the center is in this way overcome by the more 
powerful inclination of the celestial body to attract other bodies. This 
interaction between the two bodies is not “violent” (non violentus) but 
according to their respective natures.15 Analogously, God  – who has 
maximal strength and is the highest power  – can freely act upon any 
creature without thereby acting contrary to that thing’s natural powers.
DIVINE POWERS AND MIRACLES
The view presented so far is widely in accordance with dispositionalism or 
a metaphysics of powers. Along with modern dispositionalists, Aquinas 
holds that causation consists in the manifestation of a thing’s powers. 
If supernatural causes are added to this picture of powerful particulars, 
then miracles become real possibilities.16
Embracing a metaphysics of powerful particulars, however, does not 
suffice to account for miracles as traditionally understood. If causation 
is analyzed exclusively in terms of a  combination of powers, then the 
causal effect would be the result of a set of powers exercised at specific 
levels of intensity. The effect will occur when the powers taken together 
reach a specific threshold required for a specific effect. However, on this 
picture of aggregating powers, there is no qualitatively different role for 
a supernatural cause. It would be just one additional power in the set of 
14 ScG. III, 99, n. 9.
15 ScG. III, 100, n. 4.
16 It is a matter of dispute whether a supernatural cause is personal. At least prima 
facie nothing speaks against the notion of an a-personal supernatural cause.
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already existing natural powerful particulars acting upon each other. The 
specific causal role of the supernatural power would be to bring about 
(or to obstruct) a manifestation of a disposition had by that particular 
where that disposition is only realized (or obstructed) in circumstances 
which the supernatural power brings about.
At this point an immediate problem lurks: If the supernatural power 
is all-powerful, then it is hard to see how it could interact with natural 
powers at all because nothing could interfere with its causal agency. 
The consequence would be that all possible effects of natural powers to 
produce other effects than those the supernatural power causes would 
be completely neutralized. In order to avoid this consequence, we must 
assume that the supernatural power is not just an a-rational powerful 
particular with maximal strength but an entity that is able to determine 
and regulate its powers by will. Such an entity is a rational and free agent 
and as such fundamentally different from a causal power.
Causal-dispositionalist metaphysics tends to underappreciate this 
crucial difference between natural and rational powers. Take, for 
instance, the account recently proposed by Mumford & Anjum.17 They 
argue that substances, in virtue of their causal powers, have a tendency 
or propensity towards a “preferred” outcome which is neither contingent 
nor necessitated but is rather a sui generis modality falling somewhere 
in between. The idea is that, in the space between contingency and 
necessity, causation has ample opportunity to operate. This is as true of 
natural substances as it is of agents empowered with free will. In both 
cases, any alternative possibilities there may be can be attributed to the 
kind of substance at issue. The reason is that a “preferred” outcome is 
not guaranteed but merely more or less likely to happen. Whether it 
does happen depends on the substance’s causal set-up and on any causal 
interferers that may interact with it. Yet there is something that such 
an account doesn’t seem to grasp. This is that a being endowed with free 
will is fundamentally different from other beings that lack these powers. 
Thus, it is likely that two different senses of alternative possibilities” are 
invoked when we attribute such possibilities to free agents, on the one 
hand, and to natural substances, on the other. Natural substances tend 
towards one effect only, as Aristotle noted in his Metaphysics. A hot thing 
is only capable of heating other (cooler) things, and if this “preferred” 
outcome is not manifested, then it is not because of the hot thing itself 
17 Mumford & Anjum 2015.
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but because of other interfering factors, say cold water or an icy wind, 
which inhibited the manifestation of the hot thing’s power of heating. 
Rational powers, on the contrary, are “capable of opposite effects”18 
because a rational agent can possess a number of different reasons and 
accordingly a plurality of different options. Alternative possibilities are 
inherent in rational powers but external to natural ones; alternative 
possibilities are a distinctive feature of the structure of rational powers, 
whereas they only come into play in natural powers in the form of 
external interfering causal factors.
Properly understood, therefore, a  miracle is not merely an  effect 
of a cause that eludes the entire system of natural laws, but one which 
results from a cause that is essentially agential in character. A maximally 
strong power that is unable to control its own power-manifestations 
is ultimately unable to maintain entities with weaker powers in 
their existence because the maximally strong power would simply 
supersede them. Metaphorically speaking, all created substances with 
their respective powers would be swallowed by God as the supreme 
and ultimate power, in the same way that a  black hole exercises such 
a strong gravitational effect that nothing physical can escape from inside 
it. Aquinas discusses in this context the idea of intermediate powers 
exercising a kind of buffering effect which enables a very powerful being 
to bring about small-scale effects.19
This strategy might be helpful in regard of a very powerful thing – say 
the blast of an explosion which manifests itself as a gentle wind at a far 
distance – but it is of little help when it comes to God. This is so because 
God is not just a great but the supreme power. No intermediate power 
could resist God’s power so as to buffer God’s small-scale interventions 
against God’s full power. Any substance that is not all-powerful is 
inefficacious against a  being which is all-powerful. For this reason, 
a complete understanding of the sort of modality operative in miracles 
points strongly toward causation by a powerful, free, and rational agent. 
Only as a free rational agent is God able to control the way in which, and 
the extent to which his powers are manifested at all levels of creation, 
18 Aristotle 1046b, 4-5.
19 ScG. III, 99, n. 2. Aquinas discusses what modern philosophers might call a “physical 
transference” theory of causation (see, for instance, Dowe 2000). He argues that a great 
power without free will can only produce effects in accordance to its power. The power 
of the effect, however, is sometimes less than that of the cause and therefore, by means of 
many intermediate causes, it is possible for a great power to produce a small-scale effect.
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and it is because God is such an agent that he can act directly act upon 
natural things. Aquinas writes:
Now, universal active power can be limited in two ways for the purpose 
of producing a  particular effect. One way is by means of a  particular 
intermediate cause: thus, the active power of a celestial body is limited 
to the effect of generating human beings by the particular power which 
is in the semen [...] Another way is by means of understanding, which 
apprehends a definite form and produces it in the effect. But the divine 
understanding is capable of knowing not only the divine essence which 
is like a universal active power, and also not only of knowing universal 
and first causes, but all particular ones, as is clear from the things said 
above. Therefore, it is able to produce immediately every effect that any 
particular agent can bring about.20
Let us take stock: We argued that an ontology of powerful particulars 
offers a model of causation that is well suited to accommodate miracles. 
There is no need to presuppose universal laws of nature that are broken by 
God’s performing a miracle. On the contrary, a model which appeals to 
a modality somewhere between contingency and necessity provides the 
resources for a notion of causation enacted by powers that tend toward 
particular manifestations. This tendency allows for different causal paths 
given a variety of circumstances. It makes sense to think of God as one 
such circumstance that can change a  thing’s original causal setting. 
However, an ontology limited to powerful particulars is insufficient to 
cope with the classical notion of a miracle, for God – as an unlimited 
power – could not directly intervene in a world of particular and limited 
powers without destroying them. This makes it necessary to conceive of 
God as a (maximally) rational and free being which is thereby able to 
limit and adjust his otherwise limitless powers according to the specific 
circumstances in which the miracle is to occur.
MIRACLES: OBSTRUCTION OR TRANSCENDENCE 
OF NATURAL DISPOSITIONS?
For a  realist account of dispositions and powers it makes sense to 
assume that a thing’s existence and persistence conditions depend on its 
dispositions and powers. For a thing to persist in time, the existence of 
20 ScG. III, 99, n. 3.
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a sort of internal causal connection between the thing’s earlier and later 
states seems necessary. This internal causal connection stems from the 
thing’s inherent powers.21
An elm tree which for some reason is not disposed to grow the leaves 
characteristic of elm trees, but suddenly grows pine needles instead, can 
hardly be regarded as elm tree anymore: a a substantial change appears 
to have taken place. An animal which for anatomical reasons lacks the 
power to bark, being able only to meow, is a cat and not a dog, because 
dogs  – for anatomical reasons  – have no inherent power to meow. 
A substance is what it is in virtue of its dispositions and powers, and if 
these dispositions and powers suddenly change22, then it makes sense to 
ask whether this change is not merely accidental but rather substantial. 
Given this understanding of a  thing’s existence and persistence, one 
might worry that God’s acting upon a  substance’s natural dispositions 
might threaten its very existence. If Jules’s and Vincent’s body, due to 
divine intervention, acquires the power to be unharmed when penetrated 
by bullets, then one might wonder what kind of thing these miraculous 
bodies are. Along the same vein, one might wonder whether the bodies 
before and after the miraculous intervention are identical.23 If getting 
hurt when being penetrated by a bullet is a direct consequence of the 
very nature of an  organic body, then removing this power appears to 
amount to a  substantial change  – that is, the original body ceased to 
exist. Should we thus say that God, by performing a miracle, causes one 
thing to cease to exist and replaces it with a new one? Let us consider 
some possible answers to this question.
Here is a first answer: Imagine a natural inhibitor, such as a disease, 
attacking your nervous system and preventing you from moving your 
limbs. Though this change sadly affects your life considerably, it is not so 
fundamental a change that you cease to exist. Similarly, God’s intervention 
prevents the manifestation of certain natural powers but does not affect 
others. As long as a big enough set of naturally functioning powers is 
retained, the existence of the substance upon which God acts remains 
unthreatened.
21  In the persistence debate this is sometimes called the “immanent causation 
requirement”. For a detailed discussion on this topic see Zimmerman (1997), 433-471.
22 Our intuitions might be different if a change takes place over a  longer period of 
time, step by step, as Parfit (1984, 231-237) describes in the so-called spectrum cases.
23 Adams (1992), 221-223, raises these concerns.
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But this analogy is unconvincing, one might object, because it 
is reasonable to assume that there is a  kind of natural fit between 
an  inhibitor such as a  disease that affects your nervous system, and 
your nervous system itself. Whereas your nervous system has a natural 
disposition to be affected by this disease, and the disease has a natural 
disposition to affect a human nervous system, in the case of a miracle 
there seems to be no corresponding natural disposition on the part of 
the creature. In addition, miracles appear to involve a more fundamental 
change than the one suggested in the example. Water turning into wine, 
people who rise from the dead, fire that doesn’t burn, bodies that aren’t 
injured when penetrated by bullets ... in all such cases, the set of naturally 
functioning powers of the substances involved shrinks to a minimum. 
What is retained from water once it has become wine, from a  corpse 
once it is becomes a living person again, and so forth?
Here is a  second answer: E. J. Lowe distinguishes between an 
individual substance’s sortal persistence-conditions and its identity-
conditions.24 The former are the conditions under which an individual 
substance persists as an  instance of a  substantial kind. The latter are 
the conditions under which an  individual substance is reidentifiable 
over time. Distinguishing these two types of condition enables us to 
account for the metaphysical possibility of radical change. It might be 
metaphysically possible for an  individual living being, say Actaeon, to 
start life as a human and yet to survive a process of metamorphosis into 
a deer. However, since the sortal persistence-conditions of human beings 
do not allow for this type of change, the post-metamorphosis Actaeon is 
not a human being in the gestalt of a deer, but rather a real deer. He does 
not undergo a  mere phase change, but rather a  substantial change. If 
Proteus were to undergo this kind of transformation instead of Actaeon, 
by contrast, it would be a mere phase change, because it is part of the 
very nature of Proteus (and of other deities of his kind) to be able to 
undergo varied and repeated gestalt-changes.
Sortal persistence-conditions and identity-conditions can be brought 
into service to account for miracles. One might argue that the natural 
substantial kinds we are familiar with are sub-species of the higher-order 
supernatural substantial kind “creature” for all natural substantial kinds 
24 Lowe (1998), 183-184. For Lowe the sortal-persistence-conditions are a matter of 
natural law, that is, the laws of nature determine what kind of development and change 
an instance of a specific substantial kind can undergo.
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were created by God. Focusing on natural kinds alone, thus, provides 
a limited perspective on a thing’s ultimate persistence conditions because 
those of “creature” allow that all instances falling under it can undergo 
a miraculous change while still remaining the same. Or one could argue 
that a miracle is a case of transubstantiation,25 since one and the same 
individual is able to change its substantial kind.
Which interpretation is to be preferred, shall not be discussed at this 
point; the crucial insight is that Lowe’s distinction provides conceptual 
resources for addressing the worry that ultimately a miracle amounts to 
a destruction of the thing in question.
Here is a  third answer: The views discussed thus far have aimed 
to account for a  substance’s existence- and persistence-conditions 
from within, that is, by drawing on the substance’s own metaphysical 
resources. Yet these accounts miss the crucial point that each creature 
depends fundamentally on the divine will. The claim that, necessarily, 
there is a  core of natural powers which must be operative in order to 
maintain a substance in existence (or at least to retain the disposition of 
the substance’s characteristic modus operandi) is reasonable within the 
framework of the natural order. A  theistic framework, however, must 
also take into consideration the claim that God is the primary cause 
of all creation and that every moment of a  thing’s existence depends 
ultimately on the divine will. Hence any search for a  form of natural 
self-maintenance grounded in a  creature itself is idle. What the few 
occurrences of a miracle show, is precisely this ultimate dependence on 
the divine will. For this reason we shouldn’t say that God is obstructing 
or deleting the causal powers of a creature when he performs a miracle. 
Rather, God acts on the creature in a way that is impossible relative to the 
creature’s set of natural powers, but not relative to its total set of powers. 
Adams proposes this line of thought and reconciles it with the view that 
created beings are constituted by their natural powers and dispositions. 
He surmises
that the most fundamental natural faculty of any created substance is its 
liability to be affected by God.26
In order to avoid any confusion, we propose to drop the term “natural” in 
this case. If God creates the world with regard to an eschatological purpose, 
25 Lowe (1998), 184 and 186 uses this apt term.
26 Adams (1992), 224.
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then it isn’t bold to claim that each creature possesses the fundamental 
disposition to be open to God’s salvific action. This disposition is not 
deducible from the natural but the supernatural order. If this is the case, 
then a miracle does not contravene a substance’s nature; rather it is in 
deep harmony with that nature, because it is a manifestation of the most 
fundamental disposition of any creature.27 Accordingly, the causal profile 
familiar from scientific observation and personal experience is just one 
part of a  substance’s total creaturely dispositional set-up, where this 
set-up is ultimately directed toward our eschatological transformation. 
By virtue of this fundamental disposition, a creature continues to exist 
and to operate even if all of its natural powers are inoperative. Creatures 
are more protean than the natural order we are familiar with lets on. 
Only if God created a substance without the disposition to be affected 
by God would God’s actions upon it “break up” its original causal profile 
and thus destroy it. In this case one might ask, however, why God would 
create such a substance in the first place because it doesn’t seem to have 
a proper place within God’s eschatological purpose. This is the answer 
we find most convincing and in good harmony with our ontological 
considerations on the one hand and the ultimate theological framework 
of the discussion on miracles on the other hand.
Here is a fourth answer which refers again to the creation’s dependence 
upon the divine will but draws a  more radical voluntarist conclusion 
from it: The worry that a thing’s existence- and persistence-conditions 
are in tension with a miracle is a wrong starting point, for there is no 
need for God to respect any of these conditions. A creature’s nature is 
something which God creates deliberately and which is therefore subject 
to change in accordance with his will. Aquinas flirts with this thought at 
least when he says that
all creatures are related to God as art products are to an  artist [...] 
Consequently, the whole of nature is like an artifact of the divine artistic 
mind. But it is not contrary to the essential character of an artist if he 
should work in a different way on his product, even after he has given it 
its first form.28
It makes sense to suppose that the existence- and persistence conditions 
of artefacts depend on the conscious being which uses them. If x used to 
27 One might think of Rom 8, 18-22. The entire creation suffers and longs that its 
deepest inclination, being close to God, be realized.
28 ScG III, 99, n. 6.
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be a washing machine but, due to collective amnesia, is no longer used by 
anyone to wash clothes but rather as a storage space for dry clothes, then 
washing machines have gone out of existence and new artefacts have 
come into being. If this reasoning about the conventionality of artefact’s 
existence- and persistence conditions is correct, and all creatures are 
artefacts with respect to the divine mind, then all creatures’ existence- 
and persistence-conditions are from God’s perspective conventional. 
The only fixed point is the divine power itself, as Aquinas observes:
Hence, by nature’s operation, what was corrupted cannot be restored 
with numerical identity. But the divine power which brought things 
into existence operates through nature in such a way that it can produce 
an effect of nature without it, as was previously shown. Hence since the 
divine power remains the same even when things are corrupted, it can 
restore the corrupted to integrity.29
CONCLUSION
In the dialogue between Vincent and Jules, Vincent defines a miracle as 
an event in which God makes the impossible possible. In this article we 
aimed to explicate this suggestion and to provide a suitable ontological 
framework. Our proposal draws on insights from Aquinas’s discussion 
of miracles and argues that each substance possesses by nature 
a  characteristic set of powers and dispositions which are operative or 
become manifest in the right circumstances. In a miracle, the impossible 
happens in the sense that divine intervention brings something about 
which a substance’s characteristic set of natural powers and dispositions 
could not bring about by itself. Finally, we presented a variety of solutions 
to the worry that divine intervention threatens a  creature’s existence 
and persistence conditions. Our favorite solution is that each creature 
disposes of the fundamental capacity to be responsive to God’s salvific 
action, and that a miracle is something like a  triggering cause for the 
actualizing of this capacity. We take this account to be the most in line 
with a metaphysics of powers in a theistic framework.
This takes us back to the beginning. In the final scene of Pulp Fiction 
Jules and Vincent sit in a  café having breakfast, when Pumpkin and 
Honey Bunny, two petty criminals, stage a robbery. It ends in a failure 
when Jules sticks his .45 under Pumpkin’s chin. Here are excerpts from 
29 ScG IV, 81, n. 5.
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Jules’s final monologue, in which he explains to Pumpkin why he is not 
going to kill him as he still would have a few hours ago:
Jules: [...] You read the bible?
Pumpkin: Not regularly.
Jules: There’s a passage I got memorized. Ezekiel 25:17. “The path of the 
righteous man is beset on all sides by the inequities of the selfish and the 
tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he who, in the name of charity and good 
will, shepherds the weak through the valley of the darkness.” [...]
I  never really questioned what it meant. [...] But I  saw some s*** this 
mornin’ made me think twice. [...] The truth is you’re the weak. And 
I’m the tyranny of evil men. But I’m tryin’. I’m tryin’ real hard to be 
a shepherd.
[Jules lowers his gun, lying it on the table]
Jules experienced what he believes to be a miracle. He felt what he took to 
be God’s touch in his life. He cannot continue his present life as a killer but 
wants to discover where God wants him to be. His inherent disposition 
to be affected by God has been activated – and this, and nothing less, is 
the ultimate aim of a miracle. What this scene of Pulp Fiction correctly 
adds is that miracles are neither based on merit, as Jules notes, nor is 
the disposition towards man’s ultimate end activated automatically as 
Vincent’s reaction to the same event indicates. If a human being does 
not allow himself or herself to be touched by God, then even divine 
intervention is futile.30
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